Brandon Weiler

As a graduate student at American University, I have been writing and sudying how and why nations-- more specifically the United States-- make the decision to go to war, whether Presidents and their cabinet and their administrations level with the public to skew intelligence information, or more even simply lie to the public itself.

As the country marks the tenth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a nagging question lingers: Why didn’t those in the U.S government—who knew the truth—speak out about the phony intelligence used by the Bush White House to justify the invasion of Iraq? Yellowcake uranium from Africa? Aluminum tubes for nuclear weapons? Connections between al Qaeda and Saddam? Throughout the U.S. intelligence community, some officials knew that these–and other assertions used to make the case for war–were based on the sketchiest of intelligence, wrong-headed assumptions and fraudulent claims. .

Slowly but surely, congress and the media have been putting together a compelling narrative about how President Bush and his top aides contrived their bogus case for war in Iraq.